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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Marcos Apollo Jimenez appeals from his judgment of conviction for sexual 
battery of a child sixteen or seventeen years of age. Mr. Jimenez pleaded guilty and the 
district court imposed a unified sentence of eighteen years, with three years fixed. 
Mr. Jimenez appeals, and he asserts that the district court erred by using Mr. Jimenez's 
decision to exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to participate in the psychosexual 
evaluation against him. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On September 5, 2013, the police received a call about a possible rape. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) Arny Orr reported that her 
boyfriend, Mr. Jimenez, had touched her daughter's vagina and attempted to rape her. 
(PSI, p.3.) Ms. Orr's daughter, who has a condition which is related to autism, reported 
that, after she had taken a shower, Mr. Jimenez took her clothes out of the bathroom 
and told her he wanted to show her something. (PSI, p.3.) According to Mr. Orr's 
daughter, Mr. Jimenez put gel on his fingers and put them in her vagina; afterward, he 
put her on the bed and had sexual intercourse with her. (PSI, p.3.) She shoved him off, 
and Mr. Jimenez apologized. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Jimenez acknowledged that he placed a 
finger in her vagina. (PSI, p.4.) 
Mr. Jimenez was charged with one count of sexual battery of a child sixteen or 
seventeen years of age and one count of rape. (R., p.33.) He pleaded guilty to the 
sexual battery charge and the State agreed to dismiss the rape charge. (R., p.54.) 
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Mr. Jimenez exercised his right not to participate in the psychosexual evaluation. 
(Sent. Tr., p.5, Ls.6-12.) The district court stated the following at the sentencing 
hearing: 
Now after you pied guilty, I ordered a presentence investigation, which has 
been completed, and a GAIN-I Core assessment, and those evaluations 
have also been completed. Additionally I also ordered a psychosexual 
evaluation and the court was advised that you refused to participate in any 
way in the psychosexual evaluation. Before we go further, I need to 
discuss that with you and make sure that you understand what is at stake 
here. My understanding is, according to the presentence investigator, is 
that you claim to be a conscious objector and didn't feel like you should 
participate in the psychosexual evaluation; is that correct? Mr. Jimenez? 
(Sent. Tr., p.4, L.17 - p.5, L.4.) Mr. Jimenez informed the court th8t he had prayed 
about it and decided not to participate in the evaluation. (Sent. Tr., p.5, Ls.6-12.) The 
court continued: 
And before you were ordered to do so, I advised you that you have certain 
rights under Idaho law, specifically based on a Supreme Court case from 
Idaho known as Estrada versus State. According to that decision, you do 
have a 5th Amendment right to remain silent in your psychosexual 
evaluation about other crimes or about any information that might cause 
the court to give you a harsher sentence. And you also have a 6th 
Amendment right to consult with counsel before you make that decision. 
My understanding is that you refused to participate because you wanted to 
exercise your right to remain silent; is that correct? 
(Sent. Tr., p.5, Ls.13-25.) Mr. Jimenez replied, "yes, sir." (Sent. Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.) 
The district court continued, "I want to make sure that you understand that you 
also refused to participate in a polygraph exam that would have given the court reason 
to know whether or not this was a single victim." (Sent. Tr., p.6, Ls.2-6.) Mr. Jimenez 
acknowledged that he understood. (Sent. Tr., p.6, Ls.6-7.) The court then stated: 
Now, I'm not here to force you to participate, you certainly have a right not 
to participate, but I want to make sure that you were clear, and I thought I 
advised you, and I hope your attorney advised you, that if you didn't 
participate in a psychosexual evaluation, the court would have little option 
- well, frankly the court would have no way to assess your risk to the 
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community. And in absence of such information, the court would not be 
beyond its rights to consider you a high risk. Do you understand that? 
(Sent. Tr., p.6, Ls.8-18.) Mr. Jimenez again stated that he understood. (Sent. Tr., p.6, 
Ls.18-19.) 
The court then gave Mr. Jimenez an opportunity to reconsider his decision, 
stating that he had never encountered a "conscientious objector before, and I'm not 
sure that's recognized in the law .... " (Sent. Tr., p.6, Ls.20-25.) The court then 
informed Mr. Jimenez that it was its understanding that he told the presentence 
investigator he did not want to participate because he did not want to divulge the names 
of other people he had been involved with, and that he would not "necessarily be 
required to give the names of any people that you didn't want to give the names of." 
(Sent. Tr., p.7, Ls.3-7.) Mr. Jimenez stated that he understood, but asserted that was 
not what he told the investigator. (Sent. Tr., p.7, Ls.10-15.) 
The court continued, "[a]nd just I want to make sure one more time, Mr. Jimenez: 
You understand that by not participating in [the evaluation], when I have to assess your 
risk, I have no reason not to assume that you are a high risk. Do you understand that?" 
(Sent. Tr., p.8, Ls.6-10.) Mr. Jimenez then asked if the court would be making an 
adverse inference with respect to his risk, to which the court responded, 
The point I'm making is that if the court doesn't have an assessment of 
your risk, that I would be within my authority from the totality of the 
circumstances, specifically the circumstances of this case that I have 
before me, to assume that you are a significant risk. Do you understand 
that? 
(Tr., p.8, Ls.13-18.) When Mr. Jimenez responded that the court had the rest of his 
criminal history, the court stated, 
Well, I have your criminal history, but I don't have your full sexual history. 
In other words I don't know whether you've abused other minors; I don't 
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know whether or you have a history of this kind of behavior, I just know 
you've never been charged with it before. 
[ ... ] 
And so that's the record before me, and I'll have to make my decision 
based upon the information I have, not the information I don't have. 
And so one of the reasons we have a psychosexual evaluation is so the 
court can understand who you are and what type of a person you are. If I 
don't have any information, then I have to look at the facts of this case and 
pretty much nothing else, or there is very little else in the record to help 
me make a decision about what kind of a person you are. I just know 
what you've done here, and that tells me what kind of a person you are, 
unless there are some other factors. 
Now there might be reasons why you don't want me to know about your 
past, and if you don't want me to know about your past, then I can't make 
you tell me; the Constitution says you don't have to tell me. But if I don't 
know your past, then I'm going to have to just judge you by the type of 
man I know you are from the information that's before me. Do you 
understand[?] 
(Sent. Tr., p.8, L.19 - p.9, L.23.) The court again gave Mr. Jimenez a chance to 
reconsider his decision not to participate in the evaluation. (Sent. Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.10, 
L.2.) Mr. Jimenez again exercised his right to refuse to participate. (Sent. Tr., p.10, 
Ls.21-22.) The parties then proceeded on to other matters. 
When discussing the fact that there were some factual disagreements about the 
conduct that took place here, the court stated, "and, again, he would have had the right 
to discuss this issue with the polygrapher, but apparently he didn't want to participate in 
that." (Sent. Tr., p.12, Ls.18-20.) 
After hearing the sentencing recommendations from the parties, the court 
proceeded to impose the sentence. The court noted that Mr. Jimenez had never been 
charged or convicted of a crime, but also noted that the presentence investigator 
recommended a prison sentence because the risk was unknown. (Sent. Tr., p.25, 
Ls.20-25.) The court then noted, "I wish I had a psychosexual evaluation to give me 
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some comfort that you would be a good risk for probation, but I don't have anything." 
(Sent. Tr., p.26, Ls.6-9.) The court then stated that it had given Mr. Jimenez multiple 
chances to reconsider and wanted Mr. Jimenez to know, "what a difficult position you 
put this court in, and the state of Idaho, and frankly your attorney, without having any 
basis to understand if you are a high or a low risk to the community." (Sent. Tr., p.26, 
Ls.10-21.) Further, "with no risk assessment, I think it would be improper for this court 
to do anything else other than err on the side of safety. And I have to make sure we 
keep this community safe." (Sent. Tr., p.27, Ls.4-9.) 
When considering the possibility of rehabilitation, the court stated, '[t)his is where 
the lack of a psychosexual evaluation really puts the court at a disadvantage, because I 
don't know how amenable you are for rehabilitation, whether or not you can be treated 
through counseling in the community .... " (Sent Tr., p.28, Ls.1-7.) The court noted 
that, "[n]ormally my inclination would be to give you at least the degree of supervision 
necessary to get you the type of help that you need," but, "with no assessment there, I 
have to go back to protection of society," and, "without the evaluation, I don't know how 
amenable you are to treatment in the community." (Sent. Tr., p.28, Ls.5-15.) 
Finally, when discussing Mr. Jimenez's criminal record, the court stated, 
The court is very aware that you have no record. I'm not sure what to 
make of that without a psychosexual evaluation or the polygraph. I could 
assume that that means that you've just never broken the law in your 
entire life, or I could assume that you've never been caught; sometimes 
it's somewhere in between. I do note that some of the dangerous 
criminals are the ones that are good enough to get away with it. But, 
again, I just don't have any evidence there to give me confidence of what 
conclusions I should draw from that. / can only assume, though, that the 
fact that you didn't participate must mean there's some information you 
don't want me to know about. I wouldn't hold that against you at a trial, 
that would be wrong because you have a right to remain silent at your trial 
and you do have a right to remain silent now, too. But generally if there is 
something that you didn't want me to know, I can only assume there is a 
good reason you didn't want me to know it. But, again, those things really 
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played no factor in my sentence. I just have to deal with the case as what 
it is, and not what it's not, and my discussion is based in the information I 
do have. 
(Sent. Tr., p.31, Ls.2-24 (emphasis added).) The court imposed a unified sentence of 
eighteen years, with three years fixed. (R., p.64.) Mr. Jimenez appealed. (R., p.75.) 
He asserts that the district court erred by using his decision to exercise his Fifth 
Amendment right not to participate in the psychosexual evaluation against him. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by using Mr. Jimenez's decision to exercise his right not to 
participate in the psychosexual evaluation against him at sentencing? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Using Mr. Jimenez's Decision To Exercise His Right Not To 
Partici ate In The Psychosexual Evaluation Against Him 
A Introduction 
Mr. Jimenez asserts that the district court, over and over again, expressed 
concern over the lack of the psychosexual evaluation and made adverse inferences 
about his criminal history and potential for rehabilitation against him. Because 
Mr. Jimenez had a Fifth Amendment right not to participate in the evaluation, he asserts 
that the district court erred by holding his decision to exercise that right against him. 
B. The District Court Erred By Using Mr. Jimenez's Decision To Exercise His Right 
Not To Participate In The Ps {Chosexual Evaluation Against Him 
Mr. Jimenez acknowledges that no objection was made to the district court's 
statements at sentencing. Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered 
for the first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195 (1992). Idaho decisional 
law, however, has long allowed appellate courts to consider a claim of error to which no 
objection was made below if the issue presented rises to the level of fundamental error. 
See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251 
(1971 ). In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court abandoned 
the definitions it had previously utilized to describe what may constitute fundamental 
error. The Perry Court held that an appellate court should reverse an unobjected-to 
error when the defendant persuades the court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or 
more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error is clear or obvious 
without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in the 
appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 
226. 
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This case involves an unwaived constitutional right. In fact, as shown in the 
Statement of Facts, it involves one that was asserted repeatedly at sentencing. The 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that "No person ... shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This safeguard 
against compelled self-incrimination applies to both the guilt and penalty phases of a 
trial. Mitchell v. United States, 562 U.S. 314, 325-27 (1999); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 
454, 462-63 (1981); Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 563-64 (2006); State v. Lankford, 
116 Idaho 860, 871-72 (1989). The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically held that the 
Fifth Amendment applies to psychosexual evaluations. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564. 
"And while an individual certainly may be penalized for violating the law, he just as 
certainly may not be punished for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional 
right" United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982) (citation omitted). Fifth 
Amendment rights are implicated when disclosures are later used against the defendant 
at either the guilt or penalty phases. See Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564 ("Incrimination is 
implicated ... when punishment could be enhanced as a result of the defendant's 
statements."). Because Mr. Jimenez is asserting that the district court punished him for 
exercising his right not to participate in a psychosexual evaluation, this claim involves 
an unwaived constitutional right. 
Second, the claim is clear or obvious from the record. Mr. Jimenez submits that 
the district court's statements contained in the Statement of Fact clearly show that the 
court was punishing him for failing to participate in the evaluation. The court began the 
sentencing hearing by discussing the lack of an evaluation. (Sent. Tr., p.4, L.17 - p.5, 
L.4.) The court also stated, "I want to make sure that you understand that you also 
refused to participate in a polygraph exam that would have given the court reason to 
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know whether or not this was a single victim." (Sent. Tr., p.6, Ls.2-6.) The court 
continued, "[a]nd just I want to make sure one more time, Mr. Jimenez: You understand 
that by not participating in that, when I have to assess your risk, I have no reason not to 
assume that you are a high risk. Do you understand that?" (Sent. Tr., p.8, Ls.6-10.) 
Thus, the court was making an adverse inference regarding the risk Mr. Jimenez posed 
based on his refusal to participate in the exam. 
Additionally, when considering the possibility of rehabilitation, the court stated, 
"[t]his is where the lack of a psychosexual evaluation really puts the court at a 
disadvantage, because I don't know how amenable you are for rehabilitation, whether or 
not you can be treated through counseling in the community .... " (Sent. Tr., p.28, 
Ls.1-7.) Thus, the court made an adverse inference with regard to Mr. Jimenez's 
potential for rehabilitation based on Mr. Jimenez's refusal to participate in the 
evaluation. 
Furthermore, the district court suggested that Mr. Jimenez had likely committed 
other crimes but had not been caught, otherwise he would have participated in the 
evaluation:, 
The court is very aware that you have no record. I'm not sure what to 
make of that without a psychosexual evaluation or the polygraph. I could 
assume that that means that you've just never broken the law in your 
entire life, or I could assume that you've never been caught; sometimes 
it's somewhere in between. I do note that some of the dangerous 
criminals are the ones that are good enough to get away with it. But, 
again, I just don't have any evidence there to give me confidence of what 
conclusions I should draw from that. / can only assume, though, that the 
fact that you didn't participate must mean there's some information you 
don't want me to know about. 
(Sent. Tr., p.31, Ls.2-24 (emphasis added).) Thus, the court assumed that Mr. Jimenez 
had a prior criminal history when the PSI revealed that he did not have previous 
charges and did so based on Mr. Jimenez's decision to exercise his right not to 
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participate in the evaluation. And while the district court later stated that this fact played 
no role in the sentence, this statement is completely belied by the frequency of the 
court's statements regarding the lack of an evaluation. Thus, the error is clear or 
obvious from the record. 
Finally, Mr. Jimenez asserts that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings. At one point, the district court explicitly stated that it would be inclined to 
impose community treatment The court stated, "[n]ormally my inclination would be to 
give you at least the degree of supervision necessary to get you the type of help that 
you need." (Sent. Tr., p.28, Ls.12-15). But, "with no assessment there, I have to go 
back to protection of society," and "without the evaluation, I don't' know how amenable 
you are to treatment in the community." (Sent. Tr., p.28, Ls.5-10.) 
The Estrada Court addressed prejudice in the context of a petition for post-
conviction relief, where the defendant must show a "reasonable probability ... the result 
of the proceeding would have been different." Estrada, 143 Idaho at 565. The Court 
held, "[t]he sentencing judge's specific, repeated references to the psychosexual 
evaluation suggest that it did play an important role in the sentencing." Id. Thus, 
"Estrada has met his burden of showing that the evaluation played a role in his 
sentence." Id. The standard for fundamental error is similar. Perry requires that [the 
defendant] must demonstrate there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
outcome of the trial. State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476,482 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Perry, 150 
Idaho at 226). In this case, the district court made specific and repeated references to 
the lack of a psychosexual evaluation. These statements reveal that the lack of the 
evaluation clearly played a role in the sentence. The third prong of the fundamental 
error standard is therefore met. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Jimenez requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and his case 
remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 1th day of December, 2014. 
J:.u~ JUSTIN M. CURTIS , _ J 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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